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Rabies is an important public health concern in North America because of recent epidemics of a rabies virus variant
associated with raccoons. The costs associated with surveillance, diagnostic testing, and post-exposure treatment of
humans exposed to rabies have fostered coordinated efforts to control rabies spread by distributing an oral rabies
vaccine to wild raccoons. Authorities have tried to contain westward expansion of the epidemic front of raccoon-
associated rabies via a vaccine corridor established in counties of eastern Ohio, western Pennsylvania, and West
Virginia. Although sporadic cases of rabies have been identified in Ohio since oral rabies vaccine distribution in 1998,
the first evidence of a significant breach in this vaccine corridor was not detected until 2004 in Lake County, Ohio.
Herein, we forecast the spatial spread of rabies in Ohio from this breach using a stochastic spatial model that was first
developed for exploratory data analysis in Connecticut and next used to successfully hind-cast wave-front dynamics of
rabies spread across New York. The projections, based on expansion from the Lake County breach, are strongly
affected by the spread of rabies by rare, but unpredictable long-distance translocation of rabid raccoons; rabies may
traverse central Ohio at a rate 2.5-fold greater than previously analyzed wildlife epidemics. Using prior estimates of the
impact of local heterogeneities on wave-front propagation and of the time lag between surveillance-based detection of
an initial rabies case to full-blown epidemic, specific regions within the state are identified for vaccine delivery and
expanded surveillance effort.
Citation: Russell CA, Smith DL, Childs JE, Real LA (2005) Predictive spatial dynamics and strategic planning for raccoon rabies emergence in Ohio. PLoS Biol 3(3): e88.
Introduction
Major recommendations from several Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) and Institute of Medicine
reports on emerging diseases underscore the importance of
improving and developing new surveillance strategies to
better inform interventions limiting the impact of novel and
reemerging disease [1,2,3,4]. By using predictive models of
spread we can position ourselves to target surveillance
activities and prepare emergency response interventions
tailored to the particular feature of an outbreak.
Rabies emergence in the eastern United States and Canada
provides an excellent example of how predictive models can
help guide surveillance and intervention strategies. Though
long endemic in the southeastern U.S., raccoon rabies
expanded rapidly along the eastern seaboard during the
1980s and 1990s from an initial focus along the West
Virginia–Virginia border; the initial focus was linked to the
long-distance translocation (LDT) of rabid animals from
Florida [5]. The particular variant of rabies virus associated
with raccoons [6,7,8] has spread as a heterogeneous wave away
from its original site of introduction and now extends as far
north as Ontario [9] and as far west as eastern Ohio,
Tennessee, and Alabama [10]. Understanding the context in
which models of rabies spread were first developed requires a
brief background explanation of the history of epidemic
raccoon rabies and the methods used to control spread.
Since late 1997–early 1998, the westward expansion of
rabies in raccoons has been curtailed through a massive
program of oral rabies vaccine (ORV) delivery focused in
eastern Ohio, and later expanded into adjacent border
counties in Pennsylvania and West Virginia. Organized by
the Ohio Departments of Health, Natural Resources, and
Agriculture, in collaboration with the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, the CDC, and Canadian agencies, a vaccine cordon
sanitaire was constructed to keep raccoon rabies out of Ohio
[11,12]; it also served the greater purpose of potentially
preventing the raccoon variant’s spread throughout the
geographic range of raccoons, which, with minor exceptions
in the southwest, includes the entire continental U.S. south of
Alaska [13]. The campaign was successful, and through 2003,
raccoon rabies in Ohio was limited to a few sporadic cases
within the vaccine zone [10]. In 2004, this comforting streak
of success came to an abrupt end.
On 21 July 2004, approximately 11 km beyond the western
extent of the vaccine corridor, a rabid raccoon was detected
in Leroy Township, Lake County, Ohio [14] (Figure 1). As of
12 August, at least ten additional rabid raccoons had been
detected in Lake County and surrounding counties (Figure
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1); given the delay of 3–4 mo between first detection of
rabies and development of a full-blown epidemic [15,16,17],
and the 40-km linear extent of this outbreak, we assume this
is a new rabies focus with the potential to engender con-
tinued spread of raccoon rabies into Ohio and areas to the
west.
Various state agencies have already initiated a remedial
wildlife vaccination program to limit further expansion of
this epidemic. However, for strategic intervention purposes,
determining the expected trajectory and velocity of rabies
spread and estimating an effective zone for remedial
vaccination would be invaluable [18]. In this paper, we use
previously verified mathematical models for predicting rabies
spatial dynamics to provide guidance on the likely trajectory
and velocity of rabies spread from this emerging focus of
infection and to identify specific areas for vaccine delivery
and active surveillance.
Results/Discussion
The Raccoon Rabies Epidemic
When the expanding wave front of raccoon rabies reached
the borders of Connecticut (CT) and New York (NY),
county-level counts of animal rabies data were already being
reported monthly to the CDC, as required for this nationally
notifiable disease. Previously we analyzed time series data
from the county-level data to make predictions about the
temporal structure of recurring epidemics and estimated the
lag time (approximately 3–4 mo) from detection of raccoon
rabies to epizootic development [15,16]. In separate analyses,
we arrived at similar estimates for surveillance delays [17].
The county-level data were suitable for assessing a general
rate of front movement across the northeastern U.S. but not
sufficiently resolved so as to provide information about local
environmental heterogeneities that may alter rates of
spread.
Concurrent with the collection of county-level data, animal
rabies cases occurring within individual townships were also
collected by NY and CT state health departments, increasing
the spatial resolution of disease reporting data 20-fold above
that available from county-level reports. This increase in
spatial resolution allowed for the construction of a detailed
spatial model of rabies spread.
The Model
The data from NY and CT have been used to parameterize
a stochastic spatial model for rabies spread among townships
(Figure 2). The model was used for an exploratory data
analysis to quantify the spatial dynamics across CT, and we
found a 7-fold reduction in local transmission when geo-
graphic regions (i.e., townships) were separated by major
rivers. In addition, the LDT of rabid animals was incorpo-
rated into the model to accommodate these rare, but
significant events, often capable of engendering epizootics
well in advance of the wave front when larger spatial domains
were examined. The spatial model parameterized for CT was
used to hind-cast the time to first appearance of raccoon
Figure 1. Spatial Location of All Positive Raccoon Rabies Cases in Eastern
Ohio as of 11 August 2004
Each sample is identified by number, date of collection, and the
laboratory responsible for the positive identification (ODH indicates
Ohio Department of Health). To date, more than 300 raccoons have
been submitted to the CDC for testing. Ci, Cincinnati; Cl, Cleveland;
Co, Columbus; T, Toledo; Y, Youngstown.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030088.g001
Figure 2. A Stochastic Model Was Used to Simulate the Heterogeneous
Spread of Raccoon Rabies on an Irregular Network, Illustrated Here on a
Simple Array
An infected township i infects its adjacent neighbor j at rate kij. In
addition, township j may become infected because of translocation of
rabid raccoons at rate lj. Heterogeneity was incorporated by allowing
the local rate of infection from neighboring townships, and the rate
of translocation, lj, to be different in different models. Each
algorithm for associating a set of rates with rivers defines a stochastic
candidate model.
The simulation algorithm involved six steps. (A) For each township,
add the rates of infection from all possible routes of infection. (B)
Add the townships rates to compute a total rate. (C) Draw a random
number to determine the elapsed time. (D) Check to see if any forced
townships have become infected in the elapsed interval. (E) If no
edges were forced, select a random township to infect. (F) Infect the
forced township, update the local rates, and repeat until each
township becomes infected (after [17]).
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030088.g002
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rabies across NY townships using only knowledge of where
the disease was introduced into the state and local hetero-
geneities that may influence the rates of spread [19]. The a
priori CT model was able to predict the pattern of spread
across NY, as well as provide an estimate of the possible effect
of ORV intervention. Having demonstrated the predictive
power of the spatial stochastic simulator for CT and NY, we
can now use the model and our knowledge of the current
outbreak to strategically forecast the spatial spread of rabies
in Ohio.
The model transforms Ohio townships into a network; local
spread of raccoon rabies among adjacent townships in the
Ohio model was predicted where two townships shared at
least one common point along their borders. An infected
township i was assumed to infect its adjacent neighbor j at
rate kij. In addition, long-distance dispersal of rabies was
incorporated by assuming a low and constant rate of global
infection lj for all uninfected townships regardless of spatial
proximity to infected neighbors (Figure 2).
Incorporating environmental heterogeneities into local
rates of spread is crucial to predicting the local wave-front
movement of terrestrial rabies. Rabies transmission was 7-
fold lower when townships were separated by a river in CT,
while in NY, the Adirondack mountain range was, and
remains, an impenetrable barrier to the incursion of raccoon
rabies. Ohio lacks the rough mountainous terrain of NY, but
it has several major rivers that could influence westward
expansion of raccoon rabies from a focus near the Pennsyl-
vania or West Virginia border; five major Ohio rivers, the
Miami, Muskingum, Scioto, Maumee, and Cuyahoga Rivers,
were incorporated into our simulations (Figure 3).
The Ohio Forecast
Transposing the model for use in Ohio merits a discussion
of the geographic differences between CT, NY, and Ohio. In
CT, the Connecticut River bisects the state, running north to
south. The river’s effect on the epidemic was maximized
because the direction of epidemic spread ran orthogonal to
the river, i.e., from west to east. Moreover, CT is much smaller
than NY or Ohio. When the model was transposed into NY
from CT, the townships in the Adirondack Mountains were
excluded a priori because none of them had ever reported a
case of raccoon rabies. The general triangular shape of NY
and the exclusion of the Adirondack townships from the
simulation, in conjunction with there being three initial foci
within NY, left few townships far from any single initial focus.
Thus, the successful hind-cast was based mostly on the
relatively predictable local dynamics. In contrast, in Ohio
we know of only one focus, in the northeastern quarter of the
state, leaving many townships hundreds of kilometers from
the epidemic focus. Given the greater distance between the
epidemic focus and far reaching townships, LDT of infected
individuals in Ohio could have a much more profound
impact on the wave-front dynamics than was possible in NY
or CT. Given the unpredictable nature of LDT events, we
present two projections. In the first projection, we ignored
LDT and focused on local rabies wave-front movement:
kij = a = 0.66 for townships not separated by a river;
kij = b = 0.12 for townships separated by a river; and l = 0.
In the second projection, we used the exact parameters fitted
to the CT epidemic: kij = a = 0.66 for townships not
separated by a river; kij = b = 0.12 for townships separated
by a river; and l = 0.0002.
The local-spread-only projection for Ohio assumed the
rabies wave-front origin was from the townships nearest the
center of the Lake County outbreak (case 3 in Figure 1), and
the epidemic was simulated without LDT. As the local
dynamics of rabies are fairly predictable, this could be
considered the best-case scenario. Retaining the parameters
for local spread from CT and disallowing any LDT, the rabies
epidemic required 70 mo to reach the western corners of the
state (Figure 4A). In the absence of LDT, the predicted rate of
front propagation is faster than previously reported for other
states because of the influence of the permissive zone of
central Ohio, in which few environmental impediments exist.
The projection with LDT was approximately one-third
faster than the local-only spread, even with the very low levels
of long-distance dispersal modeled. In these simulations
rabies spread across central Ohio within 33 mo and covered
the state by month 41 (Figure 4B). Passage across the
midsection of Ohio was particularly fast; the estimate of
100 km/y far exceeds previous estimates for the rate of spread
of raccoon rabies, which typically ranges between 30 and 60
km/y [20,21,22]. By our estimates, if unchecked, rabies will
likely spread across Ohio in the same amount of time that it
took rabies to transverse CT, even though Ohio is 2.1 times
wider than CT. The potential for such rapid spread is quite
alarming.
Adding the possibility of global LDT to the model, even
at the low rate assumed in the original model for CT, served
as a massive promoter of rapid spread. This can be en-
visaged as the worst-case scenario, with LDT greatly increas-
ing the rate of wave-front propagation across the state.
Figure 3. Satellite Image of Ohio Topography Illustrating Major River
Systems and Location of Vaccine Corridor
Extent and shape of the vaccine corridor is approximated. (Map
reproduced with permission from Ohio Department of Natural
Resources, Division of Geological Survey.)
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030088.g003
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Because of the largely unpredictable nature of LDT, it must
be assumed that reality is likely to be somewhere in between
the two modeled scenarios, but exactly where is difficult to
discern.
The picture that emerges from both scenarios suggests that
rabies will spread rapidly through the middle of Ohio, where
there are few environmental impediments to disease front
expansion. Rivers and mountains in Ohio do not constitute a
major barrier to rabies spread. Similarly, rabies will not
encounter any impediment like the Adirondack Mountains in
NY. With no effective physical barrier across the middle of
Ohio, rabies could move more rapidly through this zone then
in any previously recorded epizootic.
The design of vaccine barriers to control the Lake County
epidemic must allow for the distance the wave front will
advance prior to detection of the first laboratory-confirmed
case of raccoon variant rabies within a county. This
parameter is unknown, although estimates of the delay from
the first detected case of raccoon variant rabies to the start of
the first epidemic exist [15,16,17,18]: the delay is approx-
imately 3–4 mo. Thus, the detection of the first case of
raccoon rabies in a township through passive surveillance
indicates roughly where the front was 3–4 mo before.
As no other data exist to help assess the bias in lag between
the arrival date of raccoon rabies and the date of detection
recorded in the national surveillance database, we set the
interval from arrival to detection at 3–4 mo. This parameter
defines where to place the inner perimeter line A (Figure 4A).
Few estimates of incubation time from natural field situations
exist; however, Tinline et al. [18] provided some estimates on
the distribution of incubation times for raccoons infected
with their homologous variant. We used the 75th percentile
in incubation time from Tinline et al. [18] to derive a
confidence line for the expected wave-front advance (line B
in Figure 4A), adding the incubation time to the calculations
for line A; thus the area between perimeter lines A and B
defines the vaccination corridor required to target suscep-
tible animals (Figure 4A).
Strategic Planning and Alternative Outbreak Scenarios
Any intervention decisions or strategic plans based on
model projections require that models deliver a robust out-
come. We explored two additional scenarios for raccoon ra-
bies emergence and spread through Ohio based on potential
breach points in the vaccine corridor and consider the utility
of the model for selecting sights for enhanced surveillance.
Alternative scenario 1. A breech in the cordon sanitaire could
occur within a similar time frame as a LDT, and we con-
sidered the effects of independent and concomitant breech-
ing and LDT events in a series of alternative scenarios.
Adding such events to the spatial simulations significantly
decreases the times to first appearance of raccoon rabies
compared to that predicted solely on local spread. Modeling
various LDT scenarios is warranted because LDTs occur fre-
quently [23] and have demonstrably played a central role in
the epizootiology of raccoon rabies, and are regarded herein
and elsewhere as a critical element in our efforts to under-
stand and model the epizootic dynamics of raccoon rabies.
We simulated the pattern of rabies spread associated with a
breach in the vaccine corridor near Youngstown (near the
current outbreak location) coupled with a forced LDT event
into the Athens-Hocking landfill. The Athens-Hocking land-
fill is the landfill closest to the current front of raccoon rabies
outside of Ohio that receives interstate refuse. The LDT event
was incorporated into the computer simulation as an initial
condition that occurred at month 12 during the simulated
spread, in addition to base levels of LDT derived from CT
(l= 0.0002). Spread from the landfill in conjunction with the
advancing front originating near Youngstown generated two
advancing fronts that converged in the middle of the state
(Figure 5A).
To explore the overall impact of multiple introductions on
the time to first appearance we compared simulations with
and without the translocation event into the Athens-Hocking
landfill. The forced LDT event caused rabies to reach the
Figure 4. Predicted Trajectory of Rabies in Ohio Based on the Current
Outbreak
(A) Predicted time to first appearance (months) of raccoon rabies
spreading from Chardon Township and surrounding townships given
no vaccine intervention and with LDT excluded from model
predictions. The time course of spread is revealed through the
contour plot, where each color band indicates a given time interval to
arrival at a township. The width of the bands corresponds to velocity
of spread, with wider bands associated with more rapid spread. Major
cities are Cleveland (Cl), Youngstown (Y), Toledo (T), Columbus (Co),
and Cincinnati (Ci). The two black lines labeled A and B correspond
to the area where cases have been detected (A) and the expected
position of the wave front given a long-tailed distribution of
incubation periods.
(B) Predicted time to first appearance (months) of raccoon rabies
spreading from Chardon Township and surrounding townships given
no vaccine intervention and including estimates of long-distance
dispersal modeled in CT and NY .
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030088.g004
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southern portion of Ohio far earlier than predicted in the
absence of the forced LDT. However, the rivers seem to limit
the overall additive effect on time of first appearance in
western Ohio by acting as natural barriers to spread. There
appears to be no additive effect on the rate of disease
movement across the middle of the state associated with the
union of the advancing wave fronts, as revealed in a plot of
the residual differences between simulations (Figure 5B).
Alternative scenario 2. Rabies has a variety of alternative
paths of entry into Ohio from infected regions across the
cordon sanitaire. In this scenario, we consider the spatial
trajectories of rabies spread from a variety of single points of
entry and compare these alternative trajectories to determine
the most common areas of overlap and, hence, where rabies is
most likely to emerge. For example, we consider the
trajectory of spread given an introduction around Youngs-
town and compare this with an introduction around Bridge-
port, Ohio (near Wheeling, West Virginia), that would be near
the southern end of the vaccine corridor in Ohio.
It is reasonable to assume that the Ohio River serves as a
barrier to raccoon movement, but there is the potential for
rabid individuals to cross bridges intoOhio.Given an introduc-
tion at Bridgeport, Ohio (Figure 6), themodel predicts that the
initial westward expansion would be halted by the Muskingum
River, while northward expansion would be rapid. Following a
crossing of theMuskingum, themodel predicts the same sort of
rapid westward expansion seen in the first scenario.
Scenario comparison. By jointly considering the predic-
tions from these introduction scenarios, we demonstrate the
utility of our model in establishing sentinel points for
surveillance. Figure 6 shows the model predictions for spread
associated with a river crossing near the southern terminus of
the cordon sanitaire overlaid with our projections for spread
away from the Youngstown area introduction. From the
combination of these two scenarios we see that the first point
at which the two epidemic fronts are predicted to meet is not
along the Ohio–West Virginia border but further west
towards the interior of the state. We can use this juxtaposi-
tion of the two trajectories to establish a minimum time path
Figure 5. Combined Effects of LDT and a Break in the Vaccine Barrier on Pattern of Rabies Spread across Ohio
(A) Predicted time to first appearance (months) of raccoon rabies given a breach of the cordon sanitaire near Youngstown and the LDT of an
infected individual into the Athens-Hocking landfill at month 12.
(B) Residual differences between simulations of the Youngstown breach with and without the forced LDT event at the Athens-Hocking landfill.
The larger the red squares, the larger the residual difference between the simulations with and without the forced LDT.
Ci, Cincinnati; Cl, Cleveland; Co, Columbus; T, Toledo; Y, Youngstown.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030088.g005
Figure 6. Combination of Predicted Time to First Appearance Projections
from Youngstown Breach and Ohio River Breach Scenarios
Thick black line indicates the minimal distance between the two
epidemic foci orthogonal to the temporal contours. Given the
trajectories, the path corresponds to the most likely location where
the waves will first collide.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0030088.g006
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for the epidemic movement (Figure 6) and can suggest
sentinel points for surveillance along this line in addition to
the surveillance strategies already in place.
The three simulation sets—the current outbreak (with LDT)
and alternative scenarios 1 and 2—can be compared to assess
the sensitivity of rate estimation on at least these initial con-
ditions. A plot of the maximum residual differences in time to
first appearance between all three simulation sets suggests that
the predicted velocity and overall trajectory of rabies spread
are robust to changes in outbreak origin (Figure 7). Though
large residuals exist between the three simulations around the
introduction sites, a striking common feature of all simulation
outcomes is the rapid spread of raccoon rabies across central
Ohio given an average effect of LDT. Maximum differences in
the estimated time to raccoon rabies arrival between
simulations in central and western Ohio varied by less than
1 mo, irrespective of breach location in the ORV barrier.
Conclusions
Experience with parenteral rabies vaccination programs
and ORV-based attempts to control wildlife rabies in the U.S.
and Europe has demonstrated that all vaccine barriers are, to
some extent, permeable and vulnerable to breaches
[24,25,26]. Ohio has proven to be no exception.
Considering the vulnerabilities of any vaccine corridor,
and the difficulties inherent in anticipating break sites in a
vaccine barrier and identifying sites of LDT, the unlimited
ability to explore scenarios by mathematical simulation and
to compute and compare different design strategies for ORV
interventions provide a valuable exercise to plan for real
epidemics. From the simulations shown here, a robust pattern
of trajectory, an extraordinarily high rate of spread of
raccoon rabies through central Ohio, the significant potential
impact of LDT, and lack of environmental impediments
suggest that a strategy combining early detection and rapid
intervention are requisite if control is to succeed. A robust
intervention plan is invaluable, even if the exact site or sites
to which it is applied prove elusive.
The approach discussed here reveals some of the many gaps
in our knowledge of wildlife rabies and in the data available
to inform initial conditions for simulations. Without a second
measure of the arrival–detection delay, obtained from an
independent and extremely sensitive surveillance system (e.g.,
coupling active sampling of road-killed raccoons, purposeful
hunter collections, and kill-trap data), we have no tools to
calibrate detection times obtained through the passive
national surveillance system.
In western Europe, reinforcement of natural barriers, such
as rivers, lakes, and mountains, have been a staple in the
successful campaign to control red fox rabies by vaccination
[24]. In Massachusetts and NY, pre-existing natural (i.e., the
Adirondacks) and artificial (i.e., the Cape Cod canal [27])
impediments to the free movement of raccoons, and, hence,
raccoon rabies, were reinforced by vaccine distributions.
Unfortunately for the remedial efforts to contain the Lake
County focus in Ohio, the benefits derived from enhance-
ment of natural barriers are not an option. With the
exception of river systems in southeastern Ohio, such as the
Muskingum (for topographic details see Figure 3), there are
few natural barriers to augment ORV distribution in the Lake
County region or in central Ohio, if required.
As reinforced natural barriers are not an option for rabies
control in much of Ohio, the need for rapid remedial
intervention by ORV and intensified, active surveillance to
estimate the actual epidemic boundaries is immediate.
Enhanced surveillance, perhaps by collection and rabies
testing of road-killed raccoons, and stockpiling of ORV
sufficient to establish a new ORV barrier in central Ohio, are
prudent courses of action.
If the Lake County epidemic escapes beyond remedial
intervention efforts, the fallback position demands rapid
construction of a second cordon sanitaire spanning central
Ohio, at a location dictated by the then current position of
the epidemic. If the disease is not confined within Ohio, the
limits to raccoon variant rabies spread are defined only by the
geographic distribution of its host. Nothing short of these
activities will contain a rapidly expanding and fast-moving
epidemic of raccoon rabies, should ring vaccination and
other regional efforts fail to eliminate the current focus
around Lake County. The interventions described here would
appear as inexpensive alternatives to the uncontrolled
westward spread of rabies and the loss of the millions of
dollars invested in what would become the vaccine equivalent
of the Maginot Line.
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